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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
In 2011, Appellee Nancy J. Becker, the Recorder of 
Deeds for Montgomery County, Pennsylvania (“the 
Recorder”), brought this action on behalf of herself and other 
similarly situated county recorders of deeds in Pennsylvania 
against MERSCORP, Inc. and Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc., entities associated with the MERS 
System (“MERS”), a national electronic registry system for 
mortgage loans.  The Recorder sought to recover millions of 
dollars in unpaid recording fees, contending that the MERS 
entities have unlawfully failed to pay such fees in violation of 
Pennsylvania law, 21 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 351.   Because 
we conclude that § 351 does not create a duty to record all 
land conveyances, a key premise on which the Recorder’s 
claims were and are based, we will reverse.   
We will also deny the Recorder’s motion for 
certification of two issues to the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania.  The answer to the issue of state law that 
decides this case, at least before us, is so clear that we would 
be abdicating our responsibilities by punting.  We recognize, 
of course, that were the Supreme Court at some point to 
answer the question differently, that decision would control.  
Cf.  County of Ramsey v. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., 776 
F.3d 947, 951 (8th Cir. 2014) (declining to certify issue to the 
state’s highest court); Union County, Ill. v. MERSCORP, Inc., 
735 F.3d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 2013) (same).   
 
I. 
MERS is a national electronic loan registry system that 
permits its members to freely transfer, among themselves, the 
promissory notes associated with mortgages, while MERS 
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remains the mortgagee of record in public land records as 
“nominee” for the note holder and its successors and assigns.1  
MERS facilitates the secondary market for mortgages by 
permitting its members to transfer the beneficial interest 
associated with a mortgage—that is, the right to repayment 
pursuant to the terms of the promissory note—to one another, 
recording such transfers in the MERS database to notify one 
another and establish priority, instead of recording such 
transfers as mortgage assignments in local land recording 
offices.  It was created, in part, to reduce costs associated 
with the transfer of notes secured by mortgages by permitting 
note holders to avoid recording fees.   
 
In the Recorder’s class action complaint, she sought a 
declaratory judgment and permanent injunction establishing 
that the MERS entities failed to record mortgage assignments 
in violation of Pennsylvania state law, 21 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 351, and brought claims for violation of § 351, civil 
conspiracy to violate § 351, and unjust enrichment, based on 
failure to pay recording fees.2  The Recorder contends that 
                                                 
1 MERSCORP, Inc., now known as MERSCORP Holdings, 
Inc., is the parent company that owns and operates the 
system, while Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. 
is the entity that serves as mortgagee of record in local land 
recording offices.  Additional background and explanation of 
how MERS operates is set forth in the District Court’s 
opinion. 
2 The Recorder did not plead a quiet title claim, but the 
District Court nevertheless “construed the pleadings to 
raise [one] without express invocation.” (App. 70.)  We 
take no position on whether the Court acted properly in so 
doing because it is clear that the Recorder cannot maintain 
a quiet title claim, as she does not claim an interest in land, 
only an interest in recording fees.  See, e.g., Nat’l Christian 
Conference Ctr. v. Schuylkill Twp., 597 A.2d 248, 250 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1991) (“The Center does not have an interest 
to support an action to quiet title because it has no 
possessory rights in the [land] . . . .”); Moore v. Com., 
Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 566 A.2d 905, 907 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1989) (“[I]n order to prevail in an action to quiet title, 
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MERS “create[s] confusion amongst property owners, 
damage[s] the integrity of Pennsylvania’s land records, and 
den[ies] [the Recorder] and the Class millions of dollars in 
uncollected fees.”  (App. 134.)  
 
Section 351 provides as follows: 
All deeds, conveyances, contracts, and other 
instruments of writing wherein it shall be the 
intention of the parties executing the same to 
grant, bargain, sell, and convey any lands, 
tenements, or hereditaments situate in this 
Commonwealth, upon being acknowledged by 
the parties executing the same or proved in the 
manner provided by the laws of this 
Commonwealth, shall be recorded in the office 
for the recording of deeds in the county where 
such lands, tenements, and hereditaments are 
situate.  Every such deed, conveyance, contract, 
or other instrument of writing which shall not 
be acknowledged or proved and recorded, as 
aforesaid, shall be adjudged fraudulent and void 
as to any subsequent bona fide purchaser . . . . 
 
In its motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, 
MERS argued that § 351 does not impose a duty to record all 
land conveyances and that, even if § 351 imposed such a 
duty, the transfers of promissory notes among MERS 
members do not constitute assignments of the mortgage itself 
and thus are not conveyances of land.  It also argued that the 
Recorder lacked a right of action, and that, in any case, 
MERSCORP, Inc. and Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc., were not the correct parties against which a 
duty to record could be enforced. 
 
In a series of opinions, the District Court rejected these 
                                                                                                             
plaintiff must establish title by a fair preponderance of the 
evidence.”) see also Albert v. Lehigh Coal & Nav. Co., 246 
A.2d 840, 843 (Pa. 1968); White v. Young, 186 A.2d 919, 
921 (Pa. 1963). 
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arguments.3  In its opinion and order filed on October 19, 
2012, the Court held that § 351’s language providing that 
conveyances “shall be recorded” was clear, indicating that all 
conveyances must be recorded.  Montgomery Cnty., Pa. v. 
MERSCORP, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 436, 443-45 (E.D. Pa. 
2012).  The Court also observed that the statute appeared 
under a heading, “NECESSITY OF RECORDING AND 
COMPULSORY RECORDING,” while other statutes 
appeared under a heading, “INSTRUMENTS SUBJECT TO 
RECORD,” and used the words “may be recorded,” 
indicating significance in the use of the term “shall” in § 351, 
instead of “may.”  Id.  In its opinion and order filed on July 1, 
2014, the Court granted the Recorder’s request for a 
declaratory judgment and denied the MERS entities’ motion 
for summary judgment.  Montgomery Cnty., Pa. v. 
MERSCORP, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 3d 542, 565 (E.D. Pa. 2014).  
The Court stated:  “We . . . declare that Defendants’ failure to 
create and record documents evincing the transfers of 
promissory notes secured by mortgages on real estate in the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is, was and will in the future 
be, in violation of the Pennsylvania Recording law – most 
particularly 21 P.S. § 351.”  Id.  On September 8, 2014, the 
Court certified its July 1, 2014 order for interlocutory appeal.  
We granted permission to appeal, and now reverse. 
 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332, and we have jurisdiction over this 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  We 
exercise plenary review over a district court’s decision to 
grant or deny summary judgment, Post v. St. Paul Travelers 
Ins. Co., 691 F.3d 500, 514 (3d Cir. 2012), and summary 
judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a).  “Our review of the district court's interpretation of 
state law is plenary.”  Borman v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 960 
F.2d 327, 329 (3d Cir. 1992).   
                                                 
3 The District Court did, however, dismiss the Recorder’s 
conspiracy claim. 
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Where the highest court of a state has interpreted a 
state statute, “we apply the interpretation of state law by the 
state’s own courts.”  Kollar v. Miller, 176 F.3d 175, 179 (3d 
Cir. 1999).  “[W]hen there is no decision from the state's 
highest court directly on point,” however, “we are charged 
with predicting how that court would resolve the question at 
issue.”  Colliers Lanard & Axilbund v. Lloyds of London, 458 
F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2006).  In doing so, we take into 
consideration any opinions of the state’s intermediate courts, 
as well as “[t]he policies underlying applicable legal doctrine, 
current trends in the law and decisions of other courts.”  City 
of Erie, Pa. v. Guar. Nat. Ins. Co., 109 F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
 
III. 
MERS raises several arguments on appeal, only one of 
which we need address to resolve the issues in this case.  
MERS contends that § 351 does not impose a duty to record 
all land conveyances, and that the statute’s “shall be 
recorded” language, when read in context, indicates not that 
every conveyance must be recorded, but only that 
conveyances must be recorded in the county where the 
property is situated in order to preserve the property holder’s 
rights as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser.  We agree. 
No Pennsylvania court has yet addressed whether 
§ 351 creates a duty to record all land conveyances, and, as 
counsel for the Recorder acknowledged at oral argument, 
there is no decision of any Pennsylvania court applying § 351 
in a manner consistent with the Recorder’s preferred 
interpretation.4  The primary purpose of Pennsylvania’s land 
                                                 
4 There are, however, decisions of Pennsylvania courts 
referring to recording as “optional” and “not obligatory.”  See 
Pepper’s Appeal, 77 Pa. 373, 377 (Pa. 1875) (“Thus it 
appears that the language of the Acts of Assembly providing 
for the recording of written instruments has not generally 
been mandatory. . . . It is optional whether or not to record.”); 
see also Easton Rd. Enters. Inc. v. Mellon Bank, Case No. 
3220, 2007 WL 2024758 (Pa. Com. Pl. June 8, 2007) (stating 
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recording statutes is “to give public notice in whom the title 
resides; so that no one may be defrauded by deceptious 
appearance of title.”  Salter v. Reed, 15 Pa. 260, 263 (Pa. 
1850); see Mancine v. Concord-Liberty Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 
445 A.2d 744, 746 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (citing Salter).  The 
consequence of failure to record is set forth in § 351 itself:  if 
a conveyance is not recorded in the appropriate place, it is 
void as to any subsequent bona fide purchaser.  No other 
consequence for failure to record is set forth in Pennsylvania 
law.   
 
Significantly, § 351 does not specify who must record 
a conveyance, when it must be recorded, or how a duty to 
record would be enforced.  Moreover, as the District Court 
acknowledged, recording is not necessary to validly convey 
property in Pennsylvania.  See, e.g., Matter of Pentrack’s 
Estate, 405 A.2d 879, 880 (Pa. 1979) (“Title to real estate 
may be passed by delivery of a deed without recording.”); 
Fiore v. Fiore, 174 A.2d 858, 859 (Pa. 1961) (holding that 
“recording of the deed was not essential to its validity or the 
transition of the title”).  If recording of all conveyances is 
required by § 351, as the Recorder suggests, it does not 
follow that Pennsylvania courts would recognize unrecorded 
conveyances as valid. 
 
We find nothing in the history or context of § 351 to 
compel a conclusion to the contrary.  As both parties 
acknowledge, the headings cited by the District Court, 
“NECESSITY OF RECORDING AND COMPULSORY 
RECORDING,” and “INSTRUMENTS SUBJECT TO 
RECORD,” were created by the publisher’s editorial staff, not 
the legislature, and do not reflect legislative intent.  (See 
Appellee’s Br. at 35 n.12.)  The Recorder urges us to find that 
§ 351 creates a duty to record conveyances by reading the 
statute in pari materia with 21 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 356, a 
statute addressing written agreements relating to “rights or 
privileges of a permanent nature” in real property and 
containing language similar to that of § 351 (i.e., “All 
agreements . . . shall be recorded in the office for the 
                                                                                                             
that “recording is not obligatory,” citing the Pennsylvania 
Law Encyclopedia).   
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recording of deeds in the county or counties wherein such real 
property is situate”).  She argues that because the title of 
§ 356 stated that it was an act “[R]equiring the recording of 
certain written instruments pertaining to real property,” this 
proves that § 356 was intended to impose a duty to record, 
and that, by extension, § 351 must be interpreted the same 
way.  See Act of Apr. 24, 1931, P.L. 48, No. 40 (reproduced 
at Addendum B to Appellee’s Br.) (emphasis added).   
 
We find this argument unpersuasive.  Section 356 was 
enacted six years after § 351, and the use of “requiring” in the 
title of § 356 does not itself establish that § 356 imposes a 
duty to record.  See 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1924 (stating that 
while titles and headings may be considered in statutory 
interpretation, they do not control).  In any event, the title of § 
351 does not similarly use the term “requiring.”  See Act of 
May 12, 1925, P.L. 613, No. 327 (reproduced at Addendum 
A to Appellee’s Br.) (“Regulating the recording of certain 
deeds, conveyances, and other instruments of writing, and 
fixing the effect thereof as to subsequent purchasers, 
mortgagees, and judgment creditors.”) (emphasis added).  In 
addition, although the parties dispute whether § 351 and its 
predecessor statutes rendered recording mandatory or 
optional, both parties acknowledge that until 1998, § 351 co-
existed with another statute, 21 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 623, 
that explicitly indicated that the recording of mortgage 
assignments was optional.  See Act of Apr. 9, 1849, P.L. 524, 
No. 354 § 14 (reproduced at Ex. F to Appellants’ Br.).  This 
would make little sense if § 351 and its predecessor statutes 
created a duty to record all land conveyances.  
 
While the Recorder and the District Court accurately 
observed that the Pennsylvania legislature used “may be 
recorded” in other places in the recording statutes, see, e.g., 
21 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 383, 385, 404, suggesting that the 
legislature’s use of  “shall be recorded” in § 351 is 
significant, the words must be understood in context.  Section 
351 does not issue a blanket command that all conveyances 
must be recorded; it states that a conveyance “shall be 
recorded” in the appropriate place, or else the party risks 
losing his interest in the property to a bona fide purchaser.  It 
informs property owners of what steps they must take in order 
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to safeguard their interests, and does not in any way state or 
imply that failure to record constitutes a violation of the 
statute enforceable by a recorder of deeds.   
 
Our interpretation is in accord with the decisions of 
several other courts rejecting similar lawsuits brought under 
similar statutes by local recording officials against MERS 
entities.  For example, in Union County, Illinois v. 
MERSCORP, Inc., the Seventh Circuit interpreted an Illinois 
law materially identical to Pennsylvania’s § 351 and held that 
it created no mandatory duty to record.5  735 F.3d at 733-34.  
The court rejected the local recording officials’ argument that 
use of the language “shall be recorded” created a duty to 
record all conveyances.  As the court observed:  
 
[A] moment's reflection will reveal the 
shallowness of [the counties’] recourse to “plain 
meaning,” a tired, overused legal phrase. For 
suppose a department store posts the following 
notice: “All defective products must be returned 
to the fifth floor counter for refund.” Obviously 
this is not a command that defective products be 
returned; the purchaser is free to keep a 
defective product, throw it out, or give it as a 
present to his worst friend. There's an implicit 
“if” in the command: If you want to return a 
product and get a refund, here's where you have 
to return it. Similarly, section 28 of the 
Conveyances Act may just mean that if you 
want to record your property interest you must 
do so in the county in which the property is 
located.  
                                                 
5 The Illinois law provided that: 
Deeds, mortgages, powers of attorney, and 
other instruments relating to or affecting the 
title to real estate in this state, shall be recorded 
in the county in which such real estate is 
situated; but if such county is not organized, 
then in the county to which such unorganized 
county is attached for judicial purposes.  
765 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/28 (emphasis added).   
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Id. at 733.  The court went on to observe that “the purpose of 
recordation has never been understood to supplement 
property taxes by making every landowner, mortgagee, etc. 
pay a fee for a service he doesn’t want . . . . Recording is a 
valuable service, provided usually for a modest fee—but 
provided only to those who think the service worth the fee.”  
Id. at 733-34.  Likewise, the Eighth Circuit held in County of 
Ramsey v. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., that Minnesota’s 
recording statute, also nearly identical to Pennsylvania’s law, 
imposed no duty to record mortgage assignments.6  776 F.3d 
at 950.  Other decisions have likewise rejected similar 
lawsuits against MERS entities on grounds that state law 
imposed no duty to record mortgages and/or assignments of 
mortgages.  See, e.g., Harris Cnty., Tex. v. MERSCORP, Inc., 
--- F.3d ---, Case No. 14-10392, 2015 WL 3937927, *5-8 (5th 
Cir. June 26, 2015) (Texas law imposes no duty to record); 
Plymouth Cnty., Iowa v. MERSCORP, Inc., 774 F.3d 1155, 
1159 (8th Cir. 2014) (Iowa law imposes no duty to record); 
Brown v. MERS, Inc., 738 F.3d 926, 934 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(Arkansas law imposes no duty to record); Jackson Cnty., 
Mo. ex rel. Nixon v. MERSCORP, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 
1070 (W.D. Mo. 2013) (Missouri law imposes no duty to 
record).   
 
Because we conclude that Pennsylvania’s § 351 
imposes no duty to record all land conveyances, we will 
reverse the July 1, 2014 order of the District Court which 
granted the Recorder’s request for a declaratory judgment and 
                                                 
6 Minnesota’s law provided:   
Every conveyance of real estate shall be 
recorded in the office of the county recorder of 
the county where such real estate is situated; 
and every such conveyance not so recorded 
shall be void as against any subsequent 
purchaser in good faith and for a valuable 
consideration of the same real estate, or any part 
thereof, whose conveyance is first duly 
recorded . . . . 
Minn. Stat. § 507.34 (emphasis added). 
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denied the MERS entities’ motion for summary judgment.7  
                                                 
7 In light of our interpretation of § 351, the Recorder’s unjust 
enrichment claim fails as a matter of law.  To prevail on a 
claim for unjust enrichment in Pennsylvania, a plaintiff must 
prove:  “(1) benefits conferred on defendant by plaintiff; (2) 
appreciation of such benefits by defendant; and (3) 
acceptance and retention of such benefits under such 
circumstances that it would be inequitable for defendant to 
retain the benefit without payment of value.”  Mitchell v. 
Moore, 729 A.2d 1200, 1203 (Pa. Super. 1999) (quoting 
Schenck v. K.E. David, Ltd., 666 A.2d 327, 328 (Pa. Super. 
1995)).  Here, there is no evidence that the Recorder 
conferred any benefit on the MERS entities for which they 
failed to pay value.  See Harris Cnty., 2015 WL 3937927, at 
*12-13 (holding that in the absence of a duty to record, there 
could be no unjust enrichment claim (Texas law)); Cnty. of 
Ramsey, 776 F.3d at 950-51 (same (Minnesota law)); 
Plymouth Cnty., 774 F.3d at 1159 (same (Iowa law)); Brown, 
738 F.3d at 935 (same (Arkansas law)); Jackson Cnty., 915 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1070-71 (same (Missouri law)); Fuller v. Mortg. 
Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1274-75 
(M.D. Fla. 2012) (same (Florida law)).  As the Seventh 
Circuit explained in Macon County, Ill. v. MERSCORP, Inc., 
742 F.3d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 2014): 
There is no suggestion that the defendants in 
this case have committed an unlawful act, only 
that it is “unjust” that they should retain a 
benefit provided them by their circumvention of 
a method of mortgage protection that would 
yield revenues for Macon County. But they are 
not deriving any benefit from the County's 
method, the recording system, beyond the 
recording of the mortgage assignments to 
MERSCORP—for which MERSCORP pays the 
County's fee. Rather, the defendants are 
bypassing the County's recording system, as 
they are entitled to do because there is no 
requirement that either the initial granting of a 
mortgage or its assignment be recorded, let 
alone that the assignment of a promissory note 
be recorded. 
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We acknowledge the arguments of the Recorder and her 
amici contending that MERS has a harmful impact on 
homeowners, title professionals, local land records, and 
various public programs supported in part by the fees 
collected by Pennsylvania’s recorders of deeds.   In this 
appeal, however, we are not called upon to evaluate how 
MERS impacts various constituencies or to adjudicate 
whether MERS is good or bad.  Just as the Seventh Circuit 
observed in Union County, while the Recorder is critical of 
MERS in several respects, “[her] appeal claims only that 
MERSCORP is violating [state law] by failing to record its 
transfer of mortgage debts, thus depriving the county 
governments of recording fees.  That claim—the only one 
before us—has no merit.”  735 F.3d at 734-35. 
 
IV. 
We will reverse the July 1, 2014 order of the District 
Court and deny the motion for certification. 8 
                                                 
8 The Recorder moved to certify two questions of law:  first, 
whether § 351 requires the recording of land conveyances, 
and, second, whether a county’s Recorder of Deeds may bring 
an action to enforce the requirements of § 351.  Because we 
have concluded that § 351 imposes no duty to record land 
conveyances, we need not address whether a recorder has a 
right of action under the statute. We note, however, that the 
Recorder’s lack of an express or implied right of action under 
§ 351 would provide an independent ground for judgment in 
favor of MERS. See, e.g., Harris Cnty., 2015 WL 3937927, at 
*4-6 (no right of action under Texas law); Christian Cnty. 
Clerk ex rel. Kem v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 515 
F. App’x 451, 456-58 (6th Cir. 2013) (not precedential) (no 
right of action under Kentucky law); Fuller, 888 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1270-71 (no right of action under Florida law). 
